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THE HEARSAY RULE IN FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CASES--PART TWOt
LESTER B. ORFIELD*
X. BUSINESS RECORDS
Business records may sometimes come in as records of past recollection,
in which case there is involved no distinctive principle peculiar to busi-
ness records. 479
A court has stated:
Original entries of transactions made in the regular course of business when the
entrant is dead or otherwise unavailable upon being identified are admissible. Such
entries are also admissible when the entrant is present, identifies them and testifies
that they are true, although they do not refresh his memory and he has no independent
recollection of the truth of the transactions which they record. This rule grew up as a
matter of convenience, but, under the exigencies and complexities of moderm business,
it has become a rule of necessity without which the administration of justice in many
matters would be difficult or impossible.480
The first requirement is that the entry must have been made in the
regular course of business.48' That is to say the entry must have been in
the way of business. But there is no special limitation as to the nature
of the occupation. On a prosecution for unlawful acquisition, conceal-
ment and sale of heroin, memoranda of government chemists were
admitted.48 2 A court has stated that "notations of events outside the
operation of the business are not the recordation contemplated .4 1
There is considerable indication that if the entry is in preparation for
litigation it is not made in the regular course of business. The Supreme
Court so regarded a statement of an engineer involved in a railroad ac-
t Part One of this article appeared in the March issue of this volume, 32 Fordham L.
Rev. 499 (1964).
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law
479. Jewett v. United States, 15 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1926). See McCormick § 281;
Laughlin, supra note 453, at 278. On business records, see generally 2 Jones §§ 289-94;
McCormick §§ 281-90 (1954); 2 Morgan 265-76; 1 Underhill §§ 108-09; 1 Wharton
§§ 267-72; 5 Wigmore §§ 1517-61; 6 id. § 1707; Ginsburg, The Admissibility of Business
Records in Evidence, 29 Neb. L. Rev. 60 (1948); Green, The Model and Uniform Statutes
Relating to Business Entries As Evidence, 31 Tul. L. Rev. 49 (1956); Laughlin, supra note
453; Selby, Official Records and Business Entries: Their Use as Evidence in Courts Martial
and the Limitations Thereon, 11 Military L. Rev. 41 (1961); Tracy, The Introduction of
Documentary Evidence, 24 Iowa L. Rev. 454 (1939); Note, 48 Colum. L. Rev. 920 (1948);
Note, 31 Ind. L.J. 312 (1956); Comment, 46 Mich. L. Rev. 802 (1948).
480. Singer v. United States, 58 F.2d 74, 76-77 (3d Cir. 1932). See McCormick § 288;
5 Wigmore § 1521; Green, supra note 479, at 55-56; Laughlin, supra note 453, at 294-96.
481. See 5 Wigmore § 1522.
482. United States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1957).
483. Clainos v. United States, 163 F.2d 593, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1947). See also Palmer v.
Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
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cident, furnished to the company as part of its normal procedure. 484
Worksheets prepared by an internal revenue agent recording information
from a defendant's personal records were held inadmissible since made
in preparation for criminal prosecution and since no internal check on
the reliability of the agent's work was present.485 Notations made by
government agents on envelopes formerly containing heroin were not
admissible as they were made primarily for prosecution.48
The entry offered must be a part of a series of entries, not a casual
one.487 There must be regularity. On a tax evasion prosecution certain
"settlement sheets" with pencil entries made by persons not identified
and, not representing the final entries, were not admitted.48 But in a
subsequent case, a memorandum of a telephone call was held admissible
even though there was very little showing of regularity.48 The Supreme
Court in a civil case held that the records must be routine reflections of
the day to day operations of the business.490 A subsequent criminal case
took the same view.491
Proper foundation is not laid by proving merely that documents were
kept in the regular course of business. It must also be shown that it
was the regular course of such business to make a memorandum or record
at the time.492
The entry must have been made at or near the time of the transactions
recorded.493 This time limitation has been interpreted as applying to the
making of the original report by the observer.494 Entries which satisfy the
statutory requirements are admissible although made after the criminal
proceeding commenced. A memorandum of disbursements made by the
operators of an illicit still was held to be a business entry, as an entry
made of acts or transactions "then occurring."4 's On a rape prosecution,
a manifest kept by the taxi driver was held admissible, the court noting
that the entry was made within a "reasonable time" after the event in
issue.490
484. Palmer v. Hoffman, supra note 483, at 113.
485. Hartzog v. United States, 217 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1954). But see Zacher v. United
States, 227 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 993 (1956); United States
v. Mortimer, 118 F.2d 266 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 616 (1941).
486. United States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1957).
487. 5 Wigmore § 1525.
488. Singer v. United States, 58 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1932).
489. United States v. Moran, 151 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1945).
490. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1943).
491. Clainos v. United States, 163 F.2d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
492. United States v. Rappy, 157 F.2d 964 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 806 (1947).
493. Ibid. See 5 Wigmore § 1526.
494. United States v. Mortimer, 118 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1941).
495. United States v. Quick, 128 F.2d 832, 837 (3d Cir. 1942).
496. Hines v. United States, 220 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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There are decisions seeming to hold that records made with a peculiarly
powerful motive to misrepresent should not be admitted in evidence.407
But the Business Records Act contains no such provision. In fact, it
provides that all circumstances other than those mentioned in the act shall
not affect admissibility.498
The chief foundation of the special reliability of business records is
the requirement that they must be based upon the first hand observation
of someone whose job it is know the facts recorded.0 9 A collector's
entries, based on a bill of lading or a captain's verbal reports, where
neither the collector nor the captain saw the goods, were held not ad-
missible. The Supreme Court stated:
And that rule, with some exceptions not including the present case, requires, for the
admissibility of the entries, not merely that they shall be contemporaneous with the
facts to which they relate, but shall be made by parties having personal knowledge of
the facts, and be corroborated by their testimony, if living and accessible, or by proof
of their handwriting, if dead, or insane, or beyond the reach of the process or com-
mission of the court.50 0
In one case, it appeared that the marshal's office kept a record of
measurements of convicted persons, the clerk writing down the measure-
ments as they were called out by the subordinate who was taking it. The
clerk alone was called to the stand. The testimony of the clerk was
held admissible. "In a complicated transaction in which two persons
participate, we do not think that it is essential that each one should have
personal knowledge of all the steps in the transaction." 0 1 But the court
also relied on the exception as to public records. In another case the
majority of the court ignored the principle. Bankbooks showing the ac-
counts of the defendants with the bank were proved by the chief book-
keeper, although he had no personal knowledge, without calling or ac-
counting for the thirteen under-bookkeepers. 0 -
While books of account may be inadmissible as evidence so far as they
relate to accounts between the parties, °3 they may be admissible as
497. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297, 305 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 329
U.S. 781 (1945), citing 5 Wigmore § 1527; Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F2d 976 (2d Cir. 1942),
aff'd, 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
498. 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1958), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (Supp. IV, 1963).
499. McCormick § 286. See 5 Wigmore § 1530, 1530a, 1555.
500. Chaffee & Co. v. United States, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 516, 541 (1873). See also
Osborne v. United States, 17 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 751 (1927);
Grunberg v. United States, 145 Fed. 81, 97 (1st Cir. 1906).
501. United States v. Cross, 20 D.C. 365, 380, writ of error dismissed, 145 U.S. 571 (1892).
502. Greene v. United States, 154 Fed. 401, 414-15 (5th Cir. 1907). One judge dissented,
citing 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 1530 (1st ed. 1907). He asserted that all precedents were
contrary. Id. at 415 (dissenting opinion).
503. See Crawford v. United States, 30 App. D.C. 1, 20 (1907), rev'd, 212 U.S. 183
(1909).
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written corroborative evidence, and as part of a transaction, to be sub-
mitted to the jury for what they are worth. 04
In a prosecution for wrongful use of the mails to defraud in the
sale of corporate stock by false representations, the books of the corpora-
tion regularly kept in due course of business are admissible on the issue
of the financial condition of the corporation, without verification of the
entries by employees, in the absence of any contention that the books
were not accurately kept.505 There was no violation of the privilege to
confront the witnesses or of the hearsay rule. Weighers' records and
"pink books" were admitted in one case. 0 ; The entries, where possible,
were authenticated by the persons who made them.
In 1912, a court of appeals stated:
The admission in evidence of books of account of private parties constitutes one of
the exceptions to the rule of evidence which excludes hearsay testimony. The exception
was born of necessity, and the courts have always required, in the absence of statutory
provision, that before private books of account can be admitted in evidence, over the
objection of the opposing party, some evidence must be introduced as to their
trustworthiness.507
There should be testimony by some person who has knowledge either of
the correctness of the entries in the books or some knowledge of the trans-
actions on which the entry was founded. "If this rule obtains in civil
cases, it should not be relaxed in criminal cases." ' 8
The records of a telephone company are admissible where the local
manager testified that the records of long distance calls were correct and
made under this supervision, the records being made in the due course of
the daily business in a quasi-public office.50 9 The operators were not
called. Circuit Judge Rogers stated: 10 "There is no doubt that books of ac-
count, kept in the usual and regular course of business, may be admitted
in evidence when supplemented by the oath of the party who kept
504. Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 207 (1909).
505. Wilson v. United States, 190 Fed. 427, 437 (2d Cir. 1911).
506. Heike v. United States, 192 Fed. 83, 95-98 (2d Cir. 1911), aff'd, 227 U.S. 131, 144
(1913). The Supreme Court cited 2 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1521, 1530 (1st ed. 1907).
507. Phillips v. United States, 201 Fed. 259, 265 (8th Cir. 1912). As to national banks,
see Bacon v. United States, 97 Fed. 35, 40 (8th Cir. 1899). See also Reineke v. United
States, 278 Fed. 724 (8th Cir. 1922); Granzow v. United States, 261 Fed. 173 (8th Cir.
1919).
508. Phillips v. United States, supra note 507, at 269. See also Beck v. United States, 33
F.2d 107, 113 (8th Cir. 1929).
509. Robilio v. United States, 291 Fed. 975 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 716 (1923),
22 Mich. L. Rev. 266. See also Valli v. United States, 94 F.2d 687 (1st Cir. 1938); Legisla-
tion, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1044 (1934). See generally, 24 Mich. L. Rev. 721 (1926); Annot., 27
A.L.R. 1439 (1923).
510. Rumely v. United States, 293 Fed. 532, 551 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 713
(1923).
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them." The records of a bank were admitted, verified only by the
secretary, who made some of the entries.51'
A court has stated:
As we gather from the briefs and arguments, the point made is that the government
got in evidence facts appearing in the bankruptcy records; that these records are
the unsworn statements of third parties, and therefore hearsay. In the first place,
the rule against the admission of unsworn statements has many exceptions. Book
entries, made in the regular course of business at the time by one whose duty it is to
make them, are a familiar exception. For stronger reasons the solemn findings and
recitals of fact in judicial or semijudicial proceedings should be held to be evidence
of the facts so found and recited. 12
On a prosecution for fraudulent sale of mining stock, bank ledger
sheets of the defendant's accounts with deposit slips were admitted on
testimony that "the ledgers were kept by a system likely to insure ac-
curacy, and that they appear to be regular on their face." 53 Judge Hand
pointed out: "The law has much changed as to such documents; it is no
longer always necessary to produce the original entrants and make a
complete chain of direct proof."' 14 In one case, express company way-
bills and other routine records were held admissible over the objection that
they must be proved by the entrants.51 5 Where documents involve multi-
farious transactions and are prepared by numerous employees, objection
to admissibility must be directed to methods insuring accuracy, and if
challenged, the party offering documents must prove the prima facie
reliableness of the system.
Offering sheets, which the Securities and Exchange Commission re-
quires registered dealers in oil royalties to file, describing wells in which
the dealer is offering to sell a royalty interest, are not admissible under
the statute. 16 The sheets did not become competent evidence merely
because it was the course of the dealers business regularly to record
information which they got from others. The transaction which the
entrant records must be one of which either he has knowledge or which
he learns from a declarant who shall "in the course of the business trans-
mit the information for inclusion in the memorandum." '517
511. Wilkes v. United States, 291 Fed. 988 (6th Cir. 1923). See also United States
v. Mammoth Oil Co., 14 F.2d 705, 732 (8th Cir. 1926).
512. Tank v. United States, 8 F.2d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 1925).
513. United States v. Cotter, 60 F.2d 689, 693 (2d Cir. 1932).
514. Ibid.
515. United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1933).
516. United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1948). There is a contrary dictum
in McKee v. Jamestown Baking Co., 198 F.2d 551, 556 (3d Cir. 1952), but this wms
restricted to its facts in Gordan v. Robinson, 210 F.2d 192 (3d Cir. 1954).
517. The court cited Model Code of Evidence rule 514(l) and Comment (1942). 166
F.2d at 869. See the criticism of this case in Matthews v. United States, 217 F.2d 409, 415
(5th Cir. 1954). See also Note, 48 Colum. L. Rev. 920, 924-25 (1948).
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Under similar principles, charts and tables prepared from regular
entries in records and books under the supervision of an accountant are
admissible."' The adoption of the Business Records Act certainly did not
change the rule.
On June 30, 1936, Congress passed a statute on the admissibility of
books and entries.519 It has been called the most significant federal statute
on evidence.5 20 The statute,521 entitled "Records made in regular course
of business," provides in subsection (a):
In any court of the United States and in any court established by Act of Congress, any
writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as.
a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence or event, shall be ad-
missible as evidence of such act, transaction, occurrence or event, if made in
regular course of any business, and if it was the regular course of such business to.
make such memorandum or record at the time of such act, transaction, occurrence,
or event or within a reasonable time thereafter.
All other "circumstances of the making of such writing or record, including lack of
personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect its weight, but
such circumstances shall not affect its admissibility.
The term "business," as used in this section, includes business, profession, occu-
pation, and calling of every kind.
Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Supreme Court, has stated:
Thus the report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary incorporates the recom-
mendation of the Attorney General who stated in support of the legislation, "The old
common-law rule requires that every book entry be identified by the person making
it. This is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, in the case of an institution
employing a large bookkeeping staff, particularly when the entries are made by
machine. In a recent criminal case the Government was prevented from making out
a prima-facie case by a ruling that entries in the books of a bank, made in the
regular course of business, were not admissible in evidence unless the specific book-
keeper who made the entry could identify it. Since the bank employed 18 bookkeepers,
and the entries were made by bookkeeping machines, this was impossible. ' 22
Other parts of this decision laid down a narrow view of the act which
has been widely criticized.52 The matter recorded will not be under the
statute unless it is related to the inherent nature of the business in ques-
518. United States v. Mortimer, 118 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1941) (Clark, J.). The court
(at 270) cited 5 Wigmore § 1530.
519. 28 U.S.C. § 695 (1958). It was based on the model act drafted by the Common-
wealth Fund of New York in 1927.
520. Note, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 1049 n.1 (1962).
521. 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1958), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (Supp. IV, 1963).
522. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 112-13 n.3 (1943).
523. The case is criticized in Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 Harv. L. Rev.
481, 566-67 (1946). See also McCormick §§ 287-88, at 604-05; 2 Morgan 273-74; Laughlln,
Business Entries and the Like, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 276, 288-91 (1961); Note, 48 Colum. L. Rev.
920, 925-26 (1948); 43 Colum. L. Rev. 392 (1943); 31 Geo. L.J. 338 (1943); Note, 56
Harv. L. Rev. 458 (1942); 41 Mich. L. Rev. 996 (1944); Comment, 17 So. Cal. L. Rev.
165 (1943).
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tion. There must be a specific connection between the memorandum and
the type of business conducted. But in 1961, a writer concluded that
"there are more recent decisions following the doctrine of Palmer v. Hoff-
man than there are distinguishing that case."5 24 The Supreme Court re-
affirmed its views four years after its decision.52 5 A recent civil case
pretty much confined Palner v. Hoffman to its own narrow facts. '
An air mail stamp affixed by a bank in the regular course of business is
admissible. The court stated:
The appellant Thomas argues that the records in question would not be admissible
under the early common law rules and that the recent judicial and statutory changes
we have referred to are in contravention of the Sixth Amendment. But statements by
relatives as to pedigree, declarations against interest, and most important of all in
criminal trials, dying declarations, have long been recognized as admissible. It is not
necessary to say what limits the Sixth Amendment may set to the extension of
exceptions to the rule against hearsay. Probably the permissible extension is a question
of degree. We think that business records kept as a matter of ordinary routine are
often likely to be more reliable than dying declarations. It cannot be reasonably argued
that the extension of the common law book entry rule [or the Federal Business
Records Act] .. . involve any violation of the Sixth Amendment [as to confronta-
tion of witnesses]. 527
In 1944, a court pointed out that the purpose of the Business Records
Act "was to eliminate the technical requirement of proving the au-
thenticity of business records ... the mere fact that the paper offered in
evidence is taken from a business file . . . does not establish its com-
petency." '28 The same year, another court took the same view of the
purpose of the Act. The records offered "were not hearsay but constituted
proof of the condition of the company." 52 On an income tax fraud prose-
cution, a transcript of bank records of the wife of the defendant, pre-
pared by another, but checked by the witness, was admitted.30
The Business Records Act "provides for the admissibility of books
and records made in the regular course of business, but does not require
that they be correct in all respects." 531
524. Laughlin, supra note 523, at 291.
525. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 518-19 (1947).
526. United States v. New York Foreign Trade Zone Operators, 304 F2d 792 (2d Cir.
1962), 51 Geo. LJ. 390 (1963) ; 2 Washburn L.J. 176 (1962).
527. United States v. Leathers, 135 F.2d 507, 511 (2d Cir. 1943). See also United States
v. Rose, 113 F. Supp. 775 (M.D. Pa. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 215 F.2d 617 (1954).
See generally Green, supra note 479, at 54-55.
528. Schmeller v. United States, 143 F.2d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 1944).
529. Harper v. United States, 143 F.2d 795, 806 (8th Cir. 1943). But see criticism by
Green, supra note 479, at 49.
530. Zacher v. United States, 227 F.2d 219, 228 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
993 (1956).
531. United States v. Wicoff, 187 F.2d 886, 889 (7th Cir. 1q51). See also United States
v. Bernard, 287 F.2d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 1961).
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In a prosecution for aiding and abetting the assistant cashier of a
national bank in embezzlement of the bank's funds, records of the bank
and of a corporation were admissible under this statute. 2 The statute
applied to criminal cases.5 33 It does not violate the right of the defendant
to confront the witnesses against him. It makes hearsay evidence admis-
sible.5 34 The statute applied to unlawful business as well as to lawful. 35
It is enough that the records are a part, although only a minor part, of a
regular system of keeping records.530 The records offered must be relevant
and competent and should not be offered en masse.3 7 Photostats of in-
voices made in the regular course of business may be introduced where
the original invoices are not available.03 s The statute is not subject to
the best evidence rule.5
3 9
Notes and records which were customarily and routinely kept by gov-
ernment agency offices and which recorded the date and time of visits
by the defendant and other callers to the office were business entries
under the statute, and were admissible on the question of when the de-
fendant made alleged visits to the government office. 4 The term "busi-
ness" applies to government agencies.54'
In a prosecution for illegal distilling it was held that sales records,
which the seller of the sugar was required to make and submit to the
government, were not official records and were not admissible, nor were
they admissible as records kept in the regular course of business. The
latter was true because the reports were not made in connection with the
seller's own operations but at the behest of the Director of Internal
Revenue under sanction of a federal statute. Even if the statute let in
such evidence, the question might well be posed whether or not the
statute would then violate the right of a defendant to confront the wit-
nesses against him.
While the Sixth Amendment does not prevent creation of new exceptions to the
hearsay rule based upon real necessity and adequate guarantees of trustworthiness, it
does embody those requirements as essential to all exceptions to the rule, present or
532. United States v. Thompson, 27 F. Supp. 905, 906 (M.D. Pa. 1939). See also Cornes
v. United States, 119 F.2d 127, 130 (9th Cir. 1941).
533. United States v. Dewinsky, 41 F. Supp. 149 (D.N.J. 1941).
534. Olender v. United States, 237 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 982
(1957).
535. United States v. Quick, 128 F.2d 831 (3d Cir. 1942).
536. Zimberg v. United States, 142 F.2d 132 (1st Cir. 1944).
537. United States v. Michener, 152 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1945) ; Schmeller v. United States,
143 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1944).
538. United States v. Kaibney, 155 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1946).
539. United States v. Vandersee, 279 F.2d 176 (3d Cir. 1960); United States v. Kimmel,
274 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1960).
540. Finnegan v. United States, 204 F.2d 105 (8th Cir. 1953).
541. Id. at 112. See also Comment, 46 Mich. L. Rev. 802, 807-08 (1948).
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future. To hold otherwise would be to hold that Congress could abolish the right of
confrontation by making unlimited exceptions to the hearsay rule.542
On a prosecution for failure to submit to induction in the armed forces,
an objection was raised that although the draft file was produced by the
secretary of the board, no member of the board testified. On appeal, the
court simply affirmed by holding that the file was properly received into
evidence "under the federal business document rule." 543 Selective Service
files may be admitted under the statute, as well as under the official state-
ments statute and under Rule 26.144
The general rule that statements compiled from voluminous records
according to practicable and reliable methods are admissible on the
testimony of the supervising agent, even though he had not examined
each record himself, is reinforced by the statute of 1936 on business rec-
ords."' An accountant's aides whose job it is to take off material from
the public records so that the chief may construct his tables and charts
accurately are acting in the regular course of business within the statute.
Under this case, summaries of records may be introduced. The court ap-
proved charts summarizing a large number of tax record books in a
prosecution for using the mails to defraud. In another case, a transcript
of the defendant's bank record prepared by an internal revenue agent
was admitted upon his supervisor's verification. 4 The agent had not
been required to exercise discretion in the preparation of the transcript,
and the supervisor personally checked the defendant's account. In an
income tax evasion prosecution in which the Government relied on the
net worth and expenditures method, a written summary of deposits made
in and checks drawn on bank accounts, which summary was based on
records of business by a bank, which records were identified by bank
officials, was admissible as a summary or tabulation of the results of such
records.547
In a tax prosecution, the worksheets of the defendant's financial and
tax status were prepared by an internal revenue agent who was dead at
the time of the trial. The worksheets were held inadmissible."' The
542. Matthews v. United States, 217 F.2d 409, 418 (5th Cir. 1954). The court followed
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
543. Uniter States v. Borisuk, 206 F.2d 338, 340 (3d Cir. 1953). The court also cited
Fed. R. Crim. P. 27, and Fed. R. Civ. P. 44, both covering proof of official records.
544. LaPorte v. United States, 300 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1962).
545. United States v. Mortimer, 118 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1941). See generally, Comment,
37 Mich. L. Rev. 449 (1939).
546. Zacher v. United States, 227 F.2d 219, 227 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
993 (1956).
547. Papadikis v. United States, 208 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1953).
548. Hartzog v. United States, 217 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1954). The case is distinguished
in United States v. Mack, 249 F.2d 321 (7th Cir. 1957), and in United States v. Bernard,
287 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1961).
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Mortimer case549 was distinguished on the grounds that the agent's work
was not the product of "an efficient clerical system" and lacked the degree
of supervision present in that case.
In a narcotics prosecution, there was no reversible error in the admis-
sion of a long distance telephone toll ticket dated three days prior to
the defendant's mother-in-law's receipt through mail of a package of
narcotics, in view of all the circumstances in evidence and of the trial
judge's instruction explaining the Government's purpose in producing
such evidence and directing that rules of circumstantial evidence be ap-
plied by the jury.5 Judge Rives, specially concurring, thought that the
record of a transaction must not only come within the statute, but must
also be relevant to the issue on trial to be admissible. But the admission
had but slight, if any, effect and was harmless error under Rule 52 (a) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In a prosecution of a stevedoring corporation and three involved in
its management, for attempted evasion of the corporation's income taxes,
a memorandum of a telephone call to the shipper from an employee of
the stevedoring corporation, stating that one of the individual defendants
had stated that the shipper was not to use any of the figures furnished
regarding the men used in loading, although it was hearsay of such in-
dividual defendant's instruction, was admissible as a recorded entry of
the employee who made the call. 5 ' Rule 26 gave such latitude. A tran-
script of telephone conversations kept in a log in a government office was
held admissible. " 2 A memorandum of a telephone conversation had with
the defendant by a bank employee who is not available as a witness at
the trial, made by the employee as a routine record in the regular course
of business and with no motivation to prepare for litigation, and pro-
duced from the bank's records, is admissible.5
Freight bills prepared by the defendant's traffic departments, are ad-
missible in evidence. 54 A taxpayer's application to a bank for a loan
is admissible as a record kept by the bank in the ordinary course of its
business.555
In a prosecution of a truck driver for theft of an interstate shipment
of cigars, bills of lading were admissible without the Government pro-
ducing a witness who actually checked the cigar packages as they were
549. United States v. Mortimer, 118 F.2d 266, 269 (2d Cir. 1941).
550. Duncan v. United States, 197 F.2d 935, 937 (5th Cir. 1952).
551. United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp., 241 F.2d 925, 931 (2d Cir. 1957).
552. Connelly v. United States, 249 F.2d 576, 587 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 921
(1957).
553. United States v. Moran, 151 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1945).
554. West Coast Fast Freight, Inc. v. United States, 205 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1953).
555. United States v. Morris, 205 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1953).
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loaded on the truck.556 A waybill is admissible, after extensive testimony
taken from a terminal manager concerning it, even though no official or
employee of the carrier at the city where the waybill was drawn testified
as to such matters."' A ledger is admissibleY58
In a rape prosecution, a manifest kept by a taxi driver was held ad-
missible.559
In a prosecution for violation of the National Stolen Property Act by
various acts including purchase in Illinois of jewelry stolen in Michigan
from the hotel room of a jewelry firm representative, a letter by the
representative to his brother, an officer of the firm, giving a highly per-
sonal account of the robbery, is not admissible as a report made in the
regular course of business. 0
In a narcotics prosecution an exhibit consisting of envelopes in which
the government agent allegedly purchased heroin from the defendant
together with memoranda on the envelopes reciting the details of purchase
was inadmissible, and there was reversible error particularly because the
jury was allowed to take the exhibits into the jury room."' However, an
exhibit consisting of envelopes on which a chemist recorded his analysis
of the heroin, was admissible, although one judge disagreed." -
In an extortion prosecution, vouchers which included money paid to
the defendants and which had been made in the regular course of busi-
ness of the victim company and as a standard part of the voucher sys-
tem were admissible as corroboration of the Government's testimony.503
Checks made payable to a defendant in an extortion prosecution are ad-
missible.564 In an income tax evasion prosecution, checks made out to
cash, and tied in with check stubs, a cash disbursements journal, and
settlement sheets were held admissible. It made no difference that the
notations on check stubs were made by a third party. Such circumstances
affect only the weight of such evidence."65
In an income tax evasion prosecution, purchase journals and other
written documents kept by used-car dealers were properly admissible as
556. United States v. Kessler, 63 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Pa. 1945), aff'd, 153 F.2d 224 (3d
Cir. 1946). See also Robertson v. United States, 263 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1959) ; United States
v. Eisenberg, 238 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1956).
557. United States v. Olivo, 278 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1960).
558. Mende v. United States, 282 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1960).
559. Hines v. United States, 220 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
560. Gordon v. United States, 164 F.2d 855 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 862 (1947).
561. United States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1957).
562. Id. at 701 (concurring opinion).
563. United States v. Varlack, 225 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1955).
564. United States v. Palmiotti, 254 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1958).
565. Bodnar v. United States, 248 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1957).
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records kept in the regular course of business, or as documents corroborat-
ing testimony of witnesses. 66
Police records limited to records of the internal operations of the
police, showing convictions of a person, are not admissible under the
federal statute.50 7 The decision seems wrong. There was no motive on the
part of the police department to misrepresent. The record is in no way
affected by bias, judgment or memory. A better basis for the decision is
the best evidence rule. In a bank robbery case a court seemed to hold
that reports of a state highway patrol might be admissible; but the de-
fendant failed to prove prejudice from their exclusion." 8 In 1959, a
district court stated broadly that "the reports and memoranda of officers
and agents investigating an alleged crime are not admissible in evidence
under the Federal Business Records Act."50 9 State police reports were
involved, and the defendant wished to use them.
It has been stated that navy hospitals are engaged in conducting a
"business" within the statute; hence a routine record of what is done to
a patient is admissible . 7 ' But a document consisting of the defendant's
account of his past life is hearsay and not admissible. Documents con-
sisting of opinions of individual physicians based on the defendant's
history, and their own experience with him were not contemporaneous
records, and were not admissible. The defendant was trying to get the
above into evidence to prove want of mental capacity. The court pointed
out that the Government could not have used such evidence either. 71
The statute has even been used in a carnal knowledge case to provide
identification of a microscope slide containing sperm on a vaginal smear
when the examining physician could not identify the slide. 7 2 The statute
does not require that the person testifying as to the records have personal
knowledge of their contents. The statute embraces hospital records. The
case is different from one involving a specimen of urine not taken in the
regular course of business of the laboratory involved.573
566. United States v. Bernard, 287 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1961).
567. Clainos v. United States, 163 F.2d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1947), 31 Marq. L. Rev. 306
(1948), 22 So. Cal. L. Rev. 190 (1949), 26 Texas L. Rev. 669 (1948).
568. Hunt v. United States, 231 F.2d 784 (8th Cir. 1956).
569. United States v. Rothman, 179 F. Supp. 935, 938 (W.D. Pa. 1959).
570. England v. United States, 174 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1949) (dictum). See generally
McCormick § 290; 6 Wigmore § 1707. See also Braham, Case Records of Hospitals and
Doctors as Evidence Under the Business Records Act, 21 Temp. L.Q. 113 (1947); Laughlin,
supra note 523, at 299-305; McCormick, Use of Hospital Records as Evidence, 26 Tul. L. Rev.
371 (1952).
571. See Mullican v. United States, 252 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1958).
572. Wheeler v. United States, 211 F.2d 19, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
1019 (1954). See also United States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1957). See generally
Green, The Model and Uniform Statutes Relating to Business Entries as Evidence, 31 Tul.
L. Rev. 49, 50 (1956).
573. Novak v. District of Columbia, 160 F.2d 588 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
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The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that while a
hospital record is evidence of the medical data entered therein, it could
not be used to show that a patient told a nurse that her husband had
pushed her through a window, in a subsequent prosecution of the wife for
the death of her husband.574
Where the defendant pleaded insanity the trial court properly refused
to admit the naked record of a psychiatrist's opinion that the defendant
was suffering from a mental disease at a date prior to the offense. " ' The
psychiatrist was not present. Opinion, not fact, was involved. In a
prosecution under the Federal Escape Act in which the defendant pleaded
insanity as a defense, government hospital records offered by the Gov-
ernment as to the defendant's mental condition were not admissible even
though authenticated by the hospital. 70
On a prosecution for rape, the prosecutor's remark to the jury as to
the defendant's objection to admission of hospital records of physical
examination of the victim of the alleged rape was improper and required
a new trial where the records were not admitted and examination in fact
showed no evidence of rape.577
In a prosecution for using the mails to defraud, corporate books failing
to show that the corporation executed a note were held not admissible
to show that the corporation executed no note. The court conceded that
"under some circumstances it may be proper to show that books, particu-
larly public records, or account books required by law to be kept by
public utilities, banks, etc., may sometimes be admissible to prove a
negative . . . ."I" Subsequently, a civil case let in such evidence."" The
writers have favored the latter view. 80 In 1952, a federal criminal case
let in such evidence.58'
One case seemed to accept the general rule requiring the production
of the original of a writing.8 - There are cases holding that the Business
Records Act is not subject to the best evidence rule."
574. Simms v. United States, 248 F.2d 626, 630 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 875
(1957).
575. Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
961 (1958) (5-to-4 decision). For the dissent see 254 F.2d at 736-41, 743. The case was
followed although criticized in Polisnik v. United States, 259 F.2d 951, 952 n.3 (D.C. Cir.
1958). See Laughlin, Business Entries and the Like, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 276, 304-05 (1961).
576. Mullican v. United States, 252 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1958).
577. Smith v. United States, 312 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
578. Shreve v. United States, 77 F.2d 27 (9th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 654 (1936).
579. Zurick v. Wehr, 163 F.2d 791 (3d Cir. 1947).
580. McCormick § 289, at 609; 5 Wigmore § 1531; 2 Morgan 275-76. See also Model
Code of Evidence rule 514(2) (1942); Uniform Rules of Evidence rule 63(14).
581. McDonald v. United States, 200 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1952).
582. O'Shea v. United States, 93 F.2d 169 (6th Cir. 1937) (semble). See McCormick
§ 284, at 600; 5 Wigmore § 1532; Green, supra note 572, at 64.
583. United States v. Vandersee, 279 F.2d 176 (3d Cir. 1960), cerL denied, 364 U.S. 943
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One court stated: "In laying a proper foundation for the admission of
a record of original entry, it is not necessary to prove that such record
contains the first memorandum or entry of a transaction. It is sufficient
if it contains the first permanent entry of the transaction." 84
A statute provides for the use of photographic copies of business rec-
ords. 5 ' In an income tax evasion prosecution, microfilm copies made by
a bank of checks of the defendant were properly admitted.580
Professor Green has concluded that the opinion rule applies to business
entries.587 A number of federal civil cases support this view. 8 In a civil
case, excluding psychiatric reports, the court stated:
To admit this potpourri on the sole tests of regular recording and absence of motive
to misrepresent would be a drastic impairment of the right of cross-examination.
In a criminal case it is doubtful whether such a deprivation of the right of the
accused to be confronted with the witness against him would be constitutional.58 D
A party's own statements may be used against him as admissions. It
follows that the opponent may offer the party's books as containing ad-
missions favoring the opponent's assertion of facts. 00 One court stated:
"Were the corporation the opposite party here, entries on its books would
be competent evidence when in the nature of admissions, and without the
necessity of strict authentication beyond establishing the identity of the
books." '591 They are not competent against a codefendant. Account books
of the defendant were admitted for the Government, when kept "with the
knowledge and under the general direction of the defendant."50 2
Corporate books of account are not competent against a stranger. They
are not competent against shareholders as such. Where an officer has
control over the corporate books, they are competent against him on
the footing of admissions. 593 Different rules apply to partnership books
(1961) ; United States v. Kimmel, 274 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1960). See Laughlin, supra note 575,
at 292-94.
584. Somberg v. United States, 71 F.2d 637 (7th Cir. 1934). See Osborne v. United
States, 17 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1927).
585. 28 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (1958).
586. Beard v. United States, 222 F.2d 84, 91 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955).
The court cited United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied,
309 U.S. 664 (1940). See 34 Iowa L. Rev. 83 (1948); 48 Mich. L. Rev. 489 (1950).
587. Green, supra note 572, at 63. See 5 Wigmore § 1533.
588. E.g., Schering Corp. v. Marzall, 101 F. Supp. 571 (D.D.C. 1951); United States
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349, 355 (D. Mass. 1950). But see Gordon v.
Robinson, 109 F. Supp. 106 (W.D. Pa. 1952), rev'd, 210 F.2d 192 (3d Cir. 1954).
589. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297, 306 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
590. McCormick § 281, at 596; 5 Wigmore § 1557.
591. Worden v. United States, 204 Fed. 1, 6 (6th Cir. 1913). The court cited Foster v.
United States, 178 Fed. 165, 175 (6th Cir. 1910). See also Battman v. United States, 224 Fed.
819, 832 (6th Cir. 1915).
592. Preeman v. United States, 244 Fed. 1, 11 (7th Cir. 1917).
593. United States v. Feinberg, 140 F.2d 592 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 726
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because the partners have access to them, and because of their super-
vision and control over them.
XI. OFFICIAL WRITTEN STATEMENTS
Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: "An
official record or an entry therein or the lack of such a record may be
proved in the same manner as in civil cases." Rule 44 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure deals with the subject in considerable detail."9 4
Congress has been legislating on the subject of official records from
the beginning of the United States."' In 1789, an act'" provided that
copies of records in the office of the State Department should be admis-
sible. In 1797 there was a similar act 97 as to the Treasury Department.
A court has stated that official records "are not covered by the hearsay
rule. It is elementary that they are prima facie evidence of what they
purport to record." '598 The right of confrontation is not violated as
official records were admissible prior to the adoption of the Constitution.
But later, a federal district court pointed out that a statute providing for
use of copies of official records,
merely codifies a common-law exception to the hearsay rule, that where the person
whose statement is offered is unavailable for adequate reason and where there is
circumstantial probability of the truthfulness of the evidence offered then the evidence
is admissible even though hearsay .... However, even this statute does not permit
the contents of government records to be proved by parol testimony as was here
done.599
In 1916, a district court stated as to confrontation of witnesses:
True, decisions of the Supreme Court and other courts have sustained apparent ex-
ceptions to this constitutional rule, such, for example, as cases . . . where certain
records and public documents and registers were admitted, although there was no
(1944). See also Comes v. United States, 119 F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 1941); Somberg v.
United States, 71 F.2d 137 (7th Cir. 1934); McDonald v. United States, 241 Fed. 793
(6th Cir. 1917).
594. Orfield, Proof of Official Records in Federal Cases, 22 Mont. L. Rev. 137 (1961).
On official written statements see 3 Jones §§ 544-53 (5th ed. 1958); McCormick §§ 291-95;
2 Morgan 277-84; 1 Underhill § 109; 4 Wigmore § 1346(a); 5 id. §§ 1630-84; 1 Wharton
§ 272; 2 id. §§ 634-45; Selby, Official Records and Business Entries: Their Use as Evidence
in Courts-Martial and the Limitations Thereon, 11 Military L. Rev. 41 (1961); Wallace,
Official Written Statements, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 256 (1961); Note, 1954 U. Ill. L.F. 336.
595. See also Cohn v. United States, 258 Fed. 355, 361 (2d Cir. 1919).
596. 1 Stat. 69 (1789).
597. 1 Stat. 512 (1797).
598. Heike v. United States, 192 Fed. 83, 94 (2d Cir. 1911). The Supreme Court affirmed
without considering the point. 227 U.S. 131 (1913). The case held that the person making
the record need not be called.
599. United States v. Campanaro, 63 F. Supp. 811, 815 (E.D. Pa. 1945). The Court cited
5 Wigmore § 1420. See also Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795, 800 (9th Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 982 (1957).
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witness, except such documents, with which there could be confrontation. But those
apparent exceptions are not real ones, and where the facts constituting the offense
itself are necessary to be proved they must primarily be proved by living witnesses,
who must confront the accused.600
As late as 1954, a court of appeals pointed out that care must be used
in pushing the official records exception so far as to violate the right to
confrontation.601 The same year, Professor McCormick pointed out that
the exception existed before the adoption of the Constitution and that
use by the prosecution of official statements is "frequent and approved." ' 2
In an early civil case, the Supreme Court indicated that official state-
ments are admitted under an exception to the hearsay rule, because it
may reasonably be expected that an official, in fulfilling the functions of
his office will make truthful statements. Mr. Justice Wayne stated that
official statements,
are entitled to this extraordinary degree of confidence, partly because they are re-
quired by law to be kept, partly because their contents are of public interest and
notoriety, but principally because they are made under the sanction of an oath of
office, or at least under that of official duty, by accredited agents appointed for that
purpose. Moreover, as the facts stated in them are entries of a public nature, it would
often be difficult to prove them by means of sworn witnesses.003
The theory of the rule has been well stated by Circuit Judge Bone:
The reason of the rule is that it would be burdensome and inconvenient to call public
officials to appear in the myriad cases in which their testimony might be required in a
court of law, and that records and reports prepared by such officials in the course of
their duties are generally trustworthy.60 4
It is not the function of Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure to reveal when a fact must be proved by an official record.'",
The federal statute on official records 00 and Rule 27 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure deal primarily with the method of proof and
are of no aid in determining what kind of records are admissible.007 That
question must be worked out in consonance with common-law principles
in the light of reason and experience. 08 Documents of state and local
governments are treated like federal documents.0 9
600. United States v. Elder, 232 Fed. 267, 269 (W.D. Ky. 1916).
601. Matthews v. United States, 217 F.2d 409, 418 (5th Cir. 1954).
602. McCormick § 231, at 486 (1954).
603. Gaines v. Relf, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 472, 569-70 (1851) (dissenting opinion).
604. Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795, 801 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 982
(1957), citing 5 Wigmore §§ 1631-32.
605. United States v. Scoblick, 225 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1955).
606. 28 U.S.C. § 1773.
607. Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
982 (1957) ; United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1948).
608. Olender v. United States, supra note 607, at 801.
609. Ibid.
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Where a legitimate purpose exists for recording information in official
records wholly apart from criminal prosecution, the fact that the record
may contain matters useful in a criminal prosecution will not render the
record inadmissible. A draft file was held admissible without discussion
of the point.610 In other cases, entries specifically prepared for possible
litigation have been disposed of under the Federal Business Records
Act," ' and admission denied.612
No express statute is needed to create the duty to keep records." 3 A
court stated:
There can be no doubt that official records kept by persons in public office, which
records are required to be kept either by statute or by the nature of the office, are
admissible to prove transactions occurring in the course of official duties, within the
personal observation of the official recording the transactions, without any further
guarantee of their accuracy.614
It is reversible error not to allow the defendant to introduce into evi-
dence the Commissioner's report of the preliminary examination to show
that a witness testified differently at the trial from at the preliminary ex-
amination as to a material point." As a public record is involved, there
is an exception to the hearsay rule. Hence, there need be no opportunity
to cross-examine the commissioner. Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides for the keeping of records by the commis-
sioner.
Logically, if a duty exists to record certain matters when they occur,
and if no record of such matters is found, then the absence of any entry
about them is evidence that they did not occur.61 Many federal criminal
cases both before and after the adoption of Rule 27 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure have so held. In a prosecution for embezzlement
while acting as a paymaster clerk, admission for the Government of
evidence that certain pay rolls did not contain receipt signatures after
the mass of fifty-six employees was held not reversible error." 7 But there
610. Kariakin v. United States, 261 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1958). See also LaPorte v.
United States, 300 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1962).
611. 28 U.S.C. § 1732.
612. United States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1957) (identifying data written
by federal agents on envelopes containing narcotics) ; Hartzog v. United States, 217 F.2d 706
(4th Cir. 1954) (work sheets prepared by internal revenue agent from records of defendant).
613. White v. United States, 164 U.S. 100, 103 (1896) (records of state jails); Evanston
v. Gunn, 99 U.S. 660 (1878); Mclnerney v. United States, 143 Fed. 729, 736 (1st Cir.
1906) (ship's manifest). See 5 Wigmore § 1633.
614. Greebaum v. United States, 80 F.2d 113, 126 (9th Cir. 1935).
615. Howard v. United States, 278 F.2d 872 (D.C. Cir. 1960). The court cited 5 Wigmore
§ 1633.
616. 5 Wigmore § 1633, at 519.
617. Gurinsky v. United States, 259 Fed. 378 (5th Cir. 1919). See also Stern v. United
States, 18 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1927); Petersen v. United States, 287 Fed. 17, 24 (9th Cir.
1923).
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was also testimony by witnesses in position to know. Furthermore, the
loss was established independently of the witness' evidence that the pay-
rolls were not receipted. In a prosecution for violation of the Tariff Act,
allowing an inspector of customs to testify that the customs house records
disclosed no permit to import liquor was not error as against the objection
that the records were the best evidence.618 The inspector was in charge of
the records and was familiar with them. In a prosecution for fraudulent
use of the mails in selling and delivering and conspiracy to violate the
Securities Act it was held proper to admit as an official record in support
of the contention of the Government that the securities were not regis-
tered, authenticated certification that a search of the Commissioner's
office failed to disclose that any registration certificate had been filed."' 0
In addition there was testimony of one of the defendant's employees that
he had asked the defendant about registration and had been told that it
was unnecessary. Furthermore, the defendant did not controvert the
allegation or evidence of nonregistration.
When Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was being
discussed before its adoption the proposal as to proof of lack of record
was attacked on the ground, that it violated the defendant's right of
confrontation and cross-examination. 62 0 However in a case arising in 1957,
the Fifth Circuit denied this.0 21 The same court three years earlier had
indicated that care must be taken in applying the business records ex-
ception lest the right to confrontation be violated. 22 In 1957, the Ninth
Circuit stated: "The nonexistence of such documents was testified to
by two custodial agents, the thoroughness of their search being tested
by cross-examination. This was far more than required by Rule 44 . . .
incorporated by reference in Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure .... 2
Proof of lack of official record under Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is not the only way to prove lack of record. "To establish
the fact that there is no record as to a particular matter or thing parol
evidence may be given. The proof may be made by any qualified person
who has examined the record as well as by the custodian."2 4
Logically it would seem that required statements by nonofficial persons
618. Shore v. United States, 56 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1932). See also Randall v. United
States, 148 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 885 (1945).
619. United States v. Sussman, 37 F. Supp. 294 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
620. Orfield, supra note 594, at 138.
621. T'kach v. United States, 242 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1957).
622. See note 601 supra and accompanying text.
623. De Casaus v. United States, 250 F.2d 150, 152 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
949 (1958).
624. Jackson v. United States, 250 F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir. 1958).
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may sometimes be regarded as official written statements.Y2 A person
may be an officer for the purpose of doing a single specific class of acts.
This principle has been applied to a ship's manifest.0261 On a prosecution
for violation of the oleomargarine law, the court did not seem to notice
the point. To show the amounts received by the defendant, the Govern-
ment offered the monthly returns made by a manufacturer who sold to
the defendant. By statute these returns were required to be filed with
the collector of internal revenue. The returns were held not admissible
as official statements.6 27 The public could not inspect the returns; only
internal revenue agents could. To use the returns would violate the con-
stitutional right of the defendant to confront the witnesses against him.
The persons who made the returns were not dead and could testify. Sales
records which a seller of sugar was required to make and submit to gov-
ernment officers were not official records within the official records
statute,6 28 nor business records under the Federal Business Records
Act.e 9
In England, the official statement must be open to inspection by the
public at large." ° A federal case has offered this as a reason for not ap-
plying the official statement exception.63l
In a liquor prosecution the Government may offer in evidence a peti-
tion to suppress evidence made by defendant containing a statement
that the automobile he was driving contained alcohol. Such evidence was
not privileged, and being a court record it was open to all.' Nor did
it violate the privilege against self-incrimination. It made no difference
that the petition was self-serving when made. In a prosecution for using
the mails to defraud, capital stock returns made by the president of the
corporation and filed with the Internal Revenue department were held
admissible as official records although such returns were not generally
open to inspection.633
In many cases, official statements may be made on the faith of the
acts of a subordinate. 34 A marshal's record of measurements of convicted
persons was admitted although the measurements were taken by an un-
625. 5 Wigmore § 1633a.
626. McInerney v. United States, 143 Fed. 729, 736-37 (lst Cir. 1906).
627. United States v. Elder, 232 Fed. 267 (W.D. Ky. 1916).
628. 28 U.S.C. § 1733 (1958).
629. Matthews v. United States, 217 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1954).
630. 5 Vigmore § 1634. Wigmore regards the English rule as too narrow.
631. United States v. Elder, 232 Fed. 267 (W.). Ky. 1916). See also Evanston v. Gunn,
99 U.S. 660, 666 (1878).
632. Kaiser v. United States, 60 F.2d 410 (8th Cir. 1932).
633. Lewy v. United States, 29 F.2d 462 (7th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 850
(1929). See also Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d 438, 446 (2d Cir.
1940).
634. 5 Wigmore § 1635.
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known subordinate. 35 In other cases, there may be exclusion of state-
ments not based on personal knowledge. For example, statements on
documents of a county welfare department were excluded as not within
the knowledge of the officials. 631
Where the documents offered as official records are submitted by in-
dividuals pursuant to statute, they are admissible if authenticated by the
custodian thereof, and the documents on their face purport to bear the
signatures of the persons required to submit them . 7 In a prosecution for
using the mails to defraud by a stock-selling scheme, unsigned and un-
certified cards from the Internal Revenue office in Arizona, purporting
to transcribe certain income tax returns were held not admissible. "8 The
defendants could not cross-examine the unknown writer nor could they
obtain the original return or a copy thereof. Even assuming that the
cards were public records, this would not cure violations of the hearsay
and best evidence rules. Possibly the cards were not accurately trans-
cribed from the income tax returns.
It has been pointed out that when a properly authenticated document
or admissible copy thereof appears on its face to satisfy the requisites
of an official record, the presumption arises that the record was made
by a person required by law or custom to do so, and that the entrant
performed the duty properly."' Where copies of a secret decree and
ministerial order of the Spanish Government were offered as official
records, the court held that while it was conceivable that a custodian of
records would perjure himself and falsify documents, the rule and statute
presumes that such would not be the case, but that evidence rebutting the
presumption would be received. 4 ° Likewise reports or documents sub-
mitted to federal agencies by nonofficial persons in compliance with
statutes or regulations were held admissible as official records where the
signatures thereto purported to be those of the proper persons, and no
further proof was required.0 4 1
635. United States v. Cross, 20 D.C. 365, 380, writ of error dismissed, 145 U.S. 571
(1892).
636. Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795, 801, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 982 (1957),
citing 5 Wigmore § 1635. See also Yaich v. United States, 283 F.2d 613, 616 (9th Cir. 1960).
637. Desimone v. United States, 227 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1955); Holland v. United
States, 209 F.2d 516, 520 (10th Cir.), aff'd, 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
638. Greenbaum v. United States, 80 F.2d 113, 126 (9th Cir. 1935). It has been contended
that the real question as to the effect of the error should have been whether in fact the
defendants did dispute the correctness of the purporting copy. 5 Wigmore § 1680, at 776.
639. Selby, supra note 594, at 53.
640. Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d 438, 446 (2d Cir. 1940).
See generally Wynne v. United States, 217 U.S. 234, 245 (1910).
641. Desimone v. United States, 227 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1955); Lewis v. United,
States, 38 F.2d 406, 413 (9th Cir. 1930).
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Income tax records and returns and certificates of assessments and
payments of taxes are official records. 4 -
At common law, a merchant ship's log-book was not admissible.-43 But
federal statutes have provided for their admissibility. In an early case
Mr. Justice Story stated while sitting as a Circuit Judge: "The log-book
is in no just sense proof per se of the facts therein stated, except in cer-
tain cases provided for by statute.... It could not, if it had been pro-
duced by the prisoners, have been per se admitted (if objected to) as
evidence of the facts stated therein. It would be mere hearsay not under
oath." '644 A verified copy of a ship's manifest containing a list of its alien
immigrant passengers delivered to the inspection officers of an American
port and preserved in the immigration office is a public record. 4"
On a prosecution for failure to register under the Selective Service Act,
the age of the defendant being in issue, a Catholic baptismal record, veri-
fied by the testimony of the priest, was admitted. 40 The fact was also
proven by a pension application of his mother and by a petition by his
mother for a homestead in the administration of her husband's estate,
both referring to the date of birth of the defendant. On a similar prosecu-
tion, a certified copy of a birth record was held admissible. 47
In a murder prosecution, in which the identity of the person shot with
the person named as victim in the indictment was at issue, information
furnished by a death certificate of the person named in the indictment,
which certificate showed that his death was caused by a gunshot wound
to the head, was necessarily hearsay as to the identity of the deceased
body. It is, therefore, reversible error to admit the certificate. 4 On a
prosecution for selling liquor, the defendant, in order to establish an
alibi, introduced testimony of an undertaker that he was attending a
funeral. It was held that copies of the death certificate and burial records
were without probative value and should not have been received in re-
buttal offered by the Government that burial was on another day. 40 It
made no difference that a state statute made the death record prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein.
642. Desimone v. United States, supra note 641 at 867-68; Holland v. United States,
209 F.2d 516, 520-21 (10th Cir.), aff'd, 348 U.S. 121 (1954); Mansfield v. United States,
76 F.2d 224, 231 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 601 (1935); Lewis v. United States,
38 F. 2d 406, 413 (9th Cir. 1930).
643. 5 Wigmore § 1641.
644. United States v. Gilbert, 25 Fed. Cas. 1287, 1308 (No. 15204) (C.C.D. Bass. 1834).
See Mclnerney v. United States, 143 Fed. 729, 737-38 (1st Cir. 1906), citing Wignore,
Evidence § 1641. (1st ed. 1904).
645. Mclnerney v. United States, supra note 644.
646. Phelan v. United States, 249 Fed. 43 (9th Cir. 1918).
647. Breitmayer v. United States, 249 Fed. 929 (6th Cir. 1918).
648. Austin v. United States, 208 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1953).
649. Passantino v. United States, 32 F.2d 116 (8th Cir. 1929).
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A certificate of registry is admissible to show the nationality of a
ship. 50 In a prosecution for murder on a ship, a copy of the ship's certifi-
cate of enrollment certified under seal by the deputy collector of customs
of the port where issued was held admissible to establish its national
character.0 5" The genuineness of the authentication of such a certificate,
signed by a deputy collector of customs, apparently in order, was held
to be a matter to be assumed, as was also the official character of the
purported signer and the signing by him or one authorized to sign, where
there was no evidence casting suspicion on the genuineness of the copy
of the seal or the signature, and none which challenged in any way, the
national character of the ship.
On a prosecution under the Espionage Act, the President's message to
Congress asking for a declaration of war and stating the causes making
such action desirable, was admitted as "an official public statement made
in the course of official duty by the head of the government to Congress"
as evidence of "the truth or falsity of the statements alleged to have been
made by the defendant."052
The reports of an ordinary private stenographer are not admissible.0°t
Where the stenographer is a witness the notes may be used by him as an
aid to memory.
A Maryland statute book "published by authority" was admitted. 4
On a prosecution for perjury as to citizenship in applying for a pass-
port the main issue was whether the defendant was born in the United
States or in Rumania. The Government offered a photographic copy of a
municipal record of birth of a person under his name in a specific city of
Rumania, purporting to be signed by the mayor and a notary; also an
attestation by the prefect of the district; also attestations by the Minister
of the Interior, the American consul at Bucharest and the American
Secretary of State, with a sworn translation; and a certificate by the
prefect reciting that the Mayor is officer of vital statistics under the law
of Rumania. This was excluded on the ground that no evidence was of-
fered of the terms of Rumania law, nor of the record being made "at the
time it purported to be made, in conformity with the law then in force."005
650. St. Clair v. United States, 154 U.S. 134, 151 (1894).
651. Wynne v. United States, 217 U.S. 234, 246 (1910). The Court relied on the federal
statute on proof of federal records now incorporated into 28 U.S.C. § 1733 (1958).
652. Shidler v. United States, 257 Fed. 620, 623 (9th Cir. 1919).
653. Sneierson v. United States, 264 Fed. 268 (4th Cir. 1920). The court (at 275) cited
3 Wigmore, Evidence § 1669 (1st ed. 1904). While the notes were read to the jury, the
court found it harmless error on the facts of the case.
654. United States v. Johns, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 412 (1806). See 5 Wigmore § 1684, at 846.
655. Duncan v. United States, 68 F.2d 136, 142 (9th Cir. 1933). See also Mole v. United
States, 315 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1953).
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The decision seems unduly strict."' The court, however, did rule that a
mere general objection was properly overruled. The objection should be
specific.
On a proceeding for extradition from the United States to India it was
held that a warrant of arrest and copies of preliminary proceedings from
Bombay, India, certified by the American consul general at Calcutta were
admissible.65
On a prosecution for using the mails to defraud by securing contribu-
tions from American heirs to the alleged Sir Francis Drake estate in
England, a document purporting to be a copy of the Drake will as ad-
judged for probate in London was authenticated by the certificate of the
assistant registrar, Wilkinson, of the probate division of the High Court
of Justice. There was a certificate of the American consul that Wilkinson
was the assistant registrar duly authorized to give copies and that the
seal was genuine. The court excluded the evidence. The consul had no
authority to so certify. "[A] foreign judgment may be authenticated (1)
by an exemplification under the great seal; (2) by a copy proved to be a
true copy; (3) by the certificate of an officer authorized by law, which
certificate must itself be properly authenticated." ' The court did not
rule on whether state law as to foreign records might apply, but found
that even if it did, the requirements of the state law were not satisfied.
The evidence was admitted over the defendant's objection, but the court
found no prejudicial error.
Copies of British statutes identified by a London barrister as "being
accepted as statute laws" of Great Britain, were held admissible. °9
There may be situations in which neither foreign official records nor
copies may be obtainable. In such cases secondary evidence should be
admissible. In a prosecution under the Foreign Agents Registration Act,
the admission of secondary evidence of the contents of letters which
passed between the German consul general in New York and the German
Charge d'Affaires in Washington was proper. °° The court took judicial
notice of the inviolability of diplomatic correspondence and the existence
of a state of war with Germany.
In 1936, Congress passed a statute providing:
A copy of any foreign document of record or on file in a public office of a foreign
country, or political subdivision thereof, certified by the lawful custodian of such
656. Morgan, Maguire & Weinstein, Cases on Evidence 125-26 (4th ed. 1957); 5 Wigmore
§ 1644, at 572-73.
657. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 313-14 (1922). A statute was involved, 22 Stat. 215,
216 (1882).
658. Hartzell v. United States, 72 F.2d 569, 579 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 621
(1934), citing Wigrmore, Evidence § 1681 (2d ed. 1923).
659. Hartzell v. United States, supra note 556, at 581. See 5 Wigznore § 1684, at 846.
660. Viereck v. United States, 139 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cr. 1944).
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document, shall be admissible in evidence in any court of the United States when
authenticated by a certificate of a consular officer of the United States resident in such
foreign country, under the seal of his office, certifying that the copy of such foreign
document has been certified by the lawful custodian thereof., 0
In 1948, Congress passed a statute on foreign documents and their au-
thentication. 62
In 1938 Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provided:
An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof, or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy and accompanied with a
certificate that such officer has the custody . . . .If the office in which the record
is kept is in a foreign state or country, the certificate may be made by a secretary
of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consulor agent or by
any officer in the foreign service of the United States stationed in the foreign state
or country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of office.
Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on Rule 44.
In March 1963, the Commission on International Rules of Judicial
Procedure transmitted to the President of the United States a proposed
bill dealing with proof of foreign official documents.00 3 It recommended
amendments to Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on which
Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is based. A new
rule 26A would govern the determination of foreign law.
On a prosecution for fraudulent use of the mails a court martial record
was excluded as irrelevant on the objection of the defendant. "It is ap-
parent from the record offered that the court-martial proceedings did not
result in a judgment either of guilt or acquittal and the issue of insanity
was not decided. 664
In a prosecution for aiding and abetting, the Government must prove
not only the aiding and abetting but that the principal committed the
offense. His prior conviction is some, but not conclusive, evidence of the
principal's guilt. 65 Minutes of the clerk showing a plea of guilty are ad-
missible.600
A person charged as an accessory after the fact is entitled to be con-
661. 28 U.S.C. § 1741 (1958). See 5 Wigmore § 1581a, at 837.
662. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3491-96 (1958).
663. 31 U.S.L. Week 2468 (March 19, 1963). See also 11 Am. J. Comp. L. 426-27 (1962).
As to the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, see 11 Am. J. Comp. L.
418, 433-36 (1962). On the existing defects see Orfield, Proof of Official Records in
Federal Cases, 22 Mont. L. Rev. 137, 157-600 (1961).
664. Lee v. United States, 91 F.2d 326 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 745 (1937).
See 1 Underhill §§ 215-29; Note, Judgments as Evidence, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 400, 410 (1961).
665. Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 59 (1899); -avener v. United States, 48 F.2d
767, 771 (6th Cir. 1931). See 2 Wharton § 560; Orfield, Burden of Proof and Presumptions
in Federal Criminal Cases, 31 U. Kan. City L. Rev. 30,40 (1963).
666. Colosacco v. United States, 196 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1952).
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fronted with the witnesses against him. Hence the principal offense can-
not be proved by the introduction of the judgment of conviction of the
perpetrators thereof. 6 7
One important use of criminal judgments as evidence involves proof
of prior conviction under habitual criminal statutes. The Government
must prove the prior conviction and the identity of the defendant as the
same person in each proceeding.668 In one case it is said that identity
of names is sufficient to establish prima facie that the defendant is the
same person as the one previously convicted."6 9 But a subsequent case
required a greater showing and stated that there was no burden on the
defendant to show that he is not the same person as the one convicted
previously. 70 The Government must first introduce in evidence the in-
dictment or information, the sentence, judgment and commitment and
then prove that the present defendant is the same as the one previously
convicted. There is sufficient proof where the Government offers a certi-
fied copy of his prior conviction together with his birth certificate and
defense counsel states categorically that he did not object to the introduc-
tion of the documents. 6 7 A statement of defense counsel in his opening
statement that there is no controversy about the defendant's prior con-
viction of selling liquor is an admission binding on the defendant, who
remained silent, thereby obviating the necessity of additional evidence
as to the exact nature of the first offense. - In the absence of such ad-
mission, proof of identity may be by the testimony of one who has per-
sonal knowledge of the prior conviction3
A deposition taken in a criminal case may not be given in evidence in a
civil action.6 74 A civil judgment is not admissible though inconsistent
with a criminal verdict even though it is the criminal defendant who
seeks to introduce it. It is not admissible either on the theory of res
judicata nor as presumptive proof of any facts determined by such
judgment.6 75
It is reversible error to introduce in evidence in a criminal proceeding
an order for a temporary injunction in a civil suit enjoining the defendant
667. Barone v. United States, 205 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1953).
668. Kubik v. United States, 53 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1931); Brown v. United States,
43 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1930) (per curiam); Powell v. United States, 35 F.2d 941, 942 (9th
Cir. 1929); Dolan v. United States, 4 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1925) (per curiam); Singer v.
United States, 278 Fed. 415 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 258 U.S. 620 (1922). See 2 Wharton
§§ 568-70, at 538-41; Orfield, supra note 660, at 39.
669. Hefferman v. United States, 50 F.2d 554 (3d Cir. 1931).
670. Gravatt v. United States, 260 F.2d 498 (10th Cir. 1958).
671. Rodriguez v. United States, 292 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1961).
672. Dick v. United States, 40 F.2d 609, 611 (8th Cir. 1930).
673. Klein v. United States, 14 F.2d 35, 36 (1st Cir. 1926) (clerk).
674. Gaines v. Relf, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 472, 575 (1851) (dissenting opinion).
675. United States v. Satuloff Bros., 79 F.2d 846, 848 (2d Cir. 1935).
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and others from interfering with a Negro's rights. "The adjudication of
a fact in a civil procedings, [sic] in view of the difference of degree of
proof in criminal and civil cases, can afford no basis for the doctrine of
res judicata, when offered in a criminal cause .... ,"I The constitutional
right of confrontation of witnesses was violated. Neither the Model Code
of Evidence nor the Uniform Rules of Evidence contains an exception to
the general rule excluding civil judgments from criminal actions.
In a perjury prosecution the judgment in a civil case in which the per-
jury is alleged to have been committed is admissible in evidence to show
the pendency of that action and the issue therein, but not for the purpose
of establishing the truth or falsity of the testimony.60 1
A judgment of acquittal in a state court is not admissible where the
defendant might have been innocent under state law and yet guilty under
the federal statute.6 78 A general verdict had been found in the state court.
It should be noted that under existing constitutional law the federal
government and the states may prosecute even though previously there
has been an acquittal by the other sovereign. Where a defendant was ac-
quitted in the federal court, it was held that Illinois could prosecute for
the same offense.679
XII. LEARNED TREATISES
Statements in medical books may not be introduced in evidence. 80 This
is true even though a state statute permits it. A criminal defendant was
not allowed to introduce into evidence his own book to show that he
was a great scientist."8" This could be established only by witnesses com-
petent on the subject.
In 1947, a court stated in a libel by the Government under the Food
and Drug Act: "While the authorities are not in complete accord, the
676. United States v. Konovsky, 202 F.2d 721, 726-27 (7th Cir. 1953). See 2 Morgan
280-81; 2 Wharton § 639; 4 Wigmore § 1346a; 5 id. § 1671a; Note, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 400,
411 (1961).
677. United States v. Burkhardt, 31 Fed. 141 (C.C.D. Ore. 1887). See 2 Wharton § 639.
678. Martin v. United States, 271 Fed. 685 (8th Cir. 1921).
679. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1958). See criticism by Perkins, Collateral Estoppel
in Criminal Cases, 1960 U. Ill. L.F. 533, 568-69; Note, 35 Ind. L.J. 444 (1960); Note, 33
Ind. L.J. 409 (1958); Comment, 65 Yale LJ. 339 (1956).
680. United States v. Perkins, 221 Fed. 109 (E.D.S.C. 1915). The court (at 110) cited
a civil case, Union Pac. Ry. v. Yates, 79 Fed. 584 (8th Cir. 1897). See also Western
Assur. Co. v. J. H. Mohlman Co., 83 Fed. 811, 820 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 168 U.S. 710
(1897). On treatises, see McCormick § 296; 2 Morgan 276-77, 319-20; Orfield, Expert
Witnesses in Federal Criminal Procedure, 20 F.R.D. 317, 344 (1958); 2 Wharton §§ 566-68,
at 72; 5 Wigmore §§ 1690-1708; Note, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 463 (1961); Note, 46 Iowa L.
Rev. 455 (1961); Note, 29 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 255 (1960); Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 77 (1958);
Annot., 82 A.L.R. 440 (1933); Annot., 65 A.L.R. 1102 (1930).
681. Samueis v. United States, 232 Fed. 536 (8th Cir. 1916).
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weight of authority is that medical books and treatises are not admissible
to prove the statements therein contained. ' 62 While a subsequent case'
conceded this to be the law, the court was impressed by Wigmore's s
contrary argument, and would not apply the rule to administrative agen-
cies. Rule 63(31) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence provides for the
admission of:
A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, science or art to
prove the truth of the matters stated therein if the judge takes judicial notice, or a
witness expert in the subject testifies, that the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is a
reliable authority on the subject. 68 5
In a murder prosecution in which the defendant sought to prove in-
sanity at the time of the offense, the Supreme Court stated:
After a witness has once qualified himself as an expert and given his own professional
opinion in reference to that which he has seen or heard, or upon hypothetical questions,
then it is ordinarily opening the door to too wide an inquiry to interrogate him as to
what other scientific men have said upon such matters, or in respect to the general
teachings of science thereon, or to permit books of science to be offered in evidence.Os O
In one case, the court stated:
It is claimed that the court erred in refusing to permit the defendant, on the cross-
examination of Dr. Dorsey, to practically introduce Gray's work on Anatomy, by
asking him question after question from that book. As this was new matter, on which
Dr. Dorsey had not been examined on his direct examination, it was properly excluded.
It is true that the witness might have been examined as to the value of Dr. Gray's
work, with which, he testified, he was familiar; but, if the defendant wanted to
introduce that work as evidence, he should have offered it as his own testimony,
and for that purpose he might have made Dr. Dorsey his own witness at the proper
time.68 7
In 1953 the late Judge Soper stated in a civil case:
Wigmore has shown... that the exception to the hearsay rule respecting the admis-
sibility in evidence of learned treatises has been recognized to a limited extent in this
country when it is shown that the writer of the work is properly qualified; but that for
the most part the exception has been repudiated. The decision in Davis v. United
States . .. is a notable example of the application of the strict rule in the examina-
tion of a medical witness, who had given his opinion as to the sanity of a defendant
in a criminal case based upon his personal observation, but was not allowed to show
682. United States v. One Device, 160 F.2d 194, 198-99 (10th Cir. 1947). See also United
States v. Paddock, 68 F. Supp. 407 (W.D. Mo. 1946).
683. Doldin Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 219 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 981 (1955).
684. 6 Wigmore § 1690.
685. For cases on judicial notice as to scientific matters, see Orfield, Judicial Notice
in Federal Criminal Procedure, 31 Fordham L. Rev. 503, S14-15 (1963).
686. Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373, 377 (1897). The court cited only a single
case, an English decision: Collier v. Simpson, 5 Car. & P. 73, 172 Eng. Rep. 883 (N.P. 1831).
687. Samuels v. United States, 232 Fed. 536, 543 (8th Cir. 1916).
1964] HEARSA Y
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the teachings of medical science in similar cases. The use of a scientific treatise in
the cross-examination of an expert witness on the stand for discrediting purposes has
also been generally repudiated in the past.6 88
When may books be used in cross-examination of the expert witness?
In an early case, the Supreme Court seems to have held that the expert
must have made a specific reference to the books as corroborating his
opinion or as a book upon which he has relied as a basis for an opinion
which he has expressed.68 But in 1949, the Supreme Court laid down a
different rule in a case involving an administrative agencyY0 0 That de-
cision has been applied even in cases not involving administrative agen-
cies. 9 '
"[T]he state of the market in securities or commodities may be proven
by reports or quotations in newspapers and trade journals." ' 2 Slot
machine prices may be thus shown. A mere statement of a witness that
an offered exhibit was a securities guide of stocks used for trading on the
exchange was insufficient foundation for its admission as evidence of the
value of the stock. Moreover, the defendants were in position to control
the entire issue of stock of the company; hence there could be no market
value.68 3 On a prosecution for unlawful sales of securities, quotation
sheets from the Seattle Mining Exchange were admitted as evidence of
prices. 94
In United States v. Hiss the results of a public opinion poll were
submitted in affidavit form to show that the defendant could not receive
a fair trial in the district of prosecution. 09 5
XIII. DECLARATIONS AND REPUTATION AS TO PEDIGREE
In 1943, the Second Circuit stated in a dictum with respect to the right
of confrontation and the pedigree exception: "But statements by rela-
tives as to pedigree . . . have long been recognized as admissible." ' 0
688. Lawrence v. Nutter, 203 F.2d 540, 542 (4th Cir. 1953).
689. Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373 (1897) (semble).
690. Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269 (1949). See Orfield, supra note 680; Note, 41 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 192 (1950); Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 77 (1958).
691. Abrams v. Gordon, 276 F.2d 500 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (per curiam); Lawrence v.
Nutter, 203 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1953).
692. Wolcher v. United States, 200 F.2d 493, 498 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
822 (1955). See Western Assur. Co. v. J. H. Mohlman Co., 83 Fed. 811, 821 (2d Cir. 1897);
6 Wigmore § 1704; Note, Commercial Lists, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 455 (1961).
693. Harris v. United States, 48 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1931).
694. Coplin v. United States, 88 F.2d 652, 669 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 703
(1937). The court cited Virginia v. West Virgina, 238 U.S. 202 (1915).
695. 185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 948 (1951). See Note, 66 Harv.
L. Rev. 498, 510 n.75 (1953); 52 Mich. L. Rev. 914 (1954); 37 Minn. L. Rev. 385 (1953);
29 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 751 (1954).
696. United States v. Leathers, 135 F.2d 507, 511 (2d Cir. 1943). On declarations concerning
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In a prosecution for statutory rape, the age of the victim may be shown
by the testimony of the victim, of her mother and of the nurse attending
at her birth. If there is error in admitting evidence of an entry in a Bible,
made by the mother five weeks after birth, it is harmless error though the
book was not a family Bible, and contained but a single entry. " Not-
withstanding the hearsay rule, a person may testify as to the date of his
birth.698
On a prosecution for bigamy, the general reputation in the community
as evidence of the marriage relation is competent as tending to prove
such relation, although it is not alone sufficient to establish it."'9
XIV. RECITALS IN ANCIENT WRITINGS
A court has pointed out:
Documents coming from official custody and bearing on their face every evidence of
age and authenticity, and which present an honest as well as ancient appearance, are
admissible in evidence as ancient documents. With reference to such documents, it is
only necessary to show that they are of the age of thirty years, and come from a
natural and reasonable custody.700
But the court found that neither the certificates nor the photograph of-
fered was ancient.
XV. REPUTATION
A court has stated: "Reputation is one thing; character is another. It
has been said that character and reputation are as distinct as are destina-
tion and journey. ' ' The Supreme Court has pointed out: "What com-
pedigree, see 2 Jones §§ 280-88 (5th ed. 1958); McCormick § 297; 2 Morgan 300-10;
1 Wharton §§ 260-66; 5 Wigmore §§ 1480-1503, 1602-06; Hale, Proof of Facts of Family
History, 2 Hastings L.J. 1 (1950); Comment, 5 Ark. L. Rev. 58 (1951); Note, 46 Iowa L.
Rev. 414 (1961); Note, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 426, 435-40 (1961); Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 1412
(1951).
697. Reagan v. United States, 202 Fed. 488 (9th Cir. 1913). See also United States v.
Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 67 F.2d 37, 45 (10th Cir. 1933) (civil case). See 5 Wigmore
§ 1496.
698. McGregor v. United States, 206 F.2d 583 (4th Cir. 1953); Antelope v. United
States, 185 F.2d 174 (loth Cir. 1950). See Slaughter v. District of Columbia, 134 A.2d 338
(D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1957); 5 Wigmore § 1493; Annot., 39 A.L.R. 376 (1925).
699. United States v. Higgerson, 46 Fed. 750 (C.C.D. Idaho 1891). See 5 Wigmore
§ 1602.
700. Hartzell v. United States, 72 F.2d 569, 580 (8th Cir. 1934) (dictum). On recitals
in ancient writings see 3 Jones §§ 569-71; McCormick § 298; 2 Morgan 316-17; 5 Wigmore
§§ 1573-74; Wickes, Ancient Documents and Hearsay, 8 Texas L. Rev. 451 (1930); Note,
Recitals in Ancient Documents, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 448 (1961); Note, 83 U. Pa. L. Rev.
247 (1934); Note, 33 Yale L.J. 412 (1924); 26 Harv. L. Rev. 544 (1913); Annot.,
46 A.L.R.2d 1318 (1956); Annot., 6 A.L.R. 1437 (1920).
701. Kreiner v. United States, 11 F.2d 722, 725 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 271 US. 688
(1926). The court cited 1 Wigmore §§ 52-88. See also 5 id. § 1608. On reputation, see
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monly is called 'character evidence' is only such when 'character' is em-
ployed as a synonym for 'reputation.' 2)702
The Supreme Court pointed out by Mr. Justice Jackson that not only
is the defendant "permitted to call witnesses to testify from hearsay, but
indeed such a witness is not allowed to base his testimony on anything
but hearsay. 7 0 3 Mr. Justice Rutledge stated in a dissenting opinion:
"The rule which allows the defendant to prove his good standing by
general reputation is, of course, a kind of exception to the hearsay rule
of exclusion, though one may inquire how else could reputation be proved
than by hearsay if it is to be proved at all.1
70 4
A court has pointed out: "Mere rumors are not reputation but reputa-
tion involves a notion of the general estimate of a person by the com-
munity as a whole. Reputation is not what a few persons may say or may
think about the accused, it is what the community generally believes. 70O
In general, the witness should not quote what others have had to say.700
A witness to the good reputation of a government witness may testify
by saying that he had never heard anything said against the person. 7 As
to the reputation of the defendant and such a statement the Supreme
Court has stated: "But this answer is accepted only from a witness whose
knowledge of defendant's habitat and surroundings is intimate enough
so that his failure to hear of any relevant ill repute is an assurance that
no ugly rumors were about.
70 8
In one case, the defendant's character witness testified that he had
never talked to anyone in the community concerning the defendant's
reputation. The witness was permitted to say that he had never heard the
defendant's character for truth and veracity questioned in the community.
It was held that testimony as to whether the defendant's reputation for
truth and veracity and obedience to the law was good or bad was
properly excluded since he had never heard it discussed and since the
witness' own personal knowledge of the defendant is not enough. 00
Where on cross-examination a character witness for the defendant testi-
fied that he had never talked to anyone about the defendant or even
discussed him, his direct examination was stricken.710
McCormick § 299; 3 Morgan 309-15; 1 Wharton §§ 273-78; 5 Wigmore §§ 1580-1626;
Ladd, Techniques and Theory of Character Testimony, 24 Iowa L. Rev. 498 (1939); Note,
Reputation, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 426 (1961).
702. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 477 (1948), citing 5 Wigmore § 1609.
703. Ibid.
704. Id. at 490.
705. Moore v. United States, 123 F.2d 207, 210 (5th Cir. 1941).
706. The court cited 5 Wigmore § 1610(2), at 480. Id. at 210.
707. Foerster v. United States, 116 Fed. 860 (8th Cir. 1902).
708. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 478 (1948), citing 5 Wigmore § 1614.
709. Deschenes v. United States, 224 F.2d 688 (10th Cir. 1955).
710. United States v. Sorkin, 275 F.2d 330 (2d Cir. 1960) (per curiam).
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Where a character witness called by the defendant states that he can
speak only for himself and not for the community, the trial court may
treat this as unwillingness to testify as to the defendant's reputation, and
excuse the witness."'
Evidence of good character must be based on the reputation of the
defendant in the community where he lives.7' One court has stated that
"the only admissible evidence of good character is what people gen-
erally, who know the accused, think about him ... ."'I' Testimony was
properly excluded where the witness did not know where the defendant
lived or any of the people of the community. 1'
On a prosecution for extortion of a custom-house officer, evidence
offered by the Government of the defendant's bad reputation "in the
Custom House" was held improperly admitted because it prevailed only
"among the limited number of people employed in a particular public
building."719 Wigmore, in criticism, has pointed out that "the place where
a reputation would be best founded is the place of daily employment."710
In 1947, testimony of a business acquaintance was excluded.717
Reputation before the time in issue may be shown .71  Remoteness in
such time should affect only the weight to be given such evidence. The
Supreme Court held it proper to ask the defendant's character witness, to
test his knowledge, if he had heard that the defendant had been arrested
twenty years previously. 719 Testimony as to the defendant's good reputa-
tion after the act charged is not admissible.720 Where the evidence of-
fered as to the bad reputation of a witness testifying against his code-
fendant is as to a time after the finding of the indictment, such testimony
may be stricken on motion of the Government.7 '
Under an exception based on necessity, evidence of the reputation of a
bawdy house may be introduced.72 On a prosecution under the Mann Act,
711. Dailey v. United States, 261 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 969 (1958).
712. Williams v. United States, 168 U.S. 382, 397 (1897). See Iva Ikuko Toguri D'Aquino
v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 372 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 935 (1952).
713. Stewart v. United States, 104 F2d 234, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (per curiam).
714. United States v. Pincourt, 159 Fa2d 917 (3d Cir. 1947).
715. Williams v. United States, 168 U.S. 382, 397 (1897).
716. 5 Wigmore, § 1616, at 489 n2.
717. United States v. Pincourt, 159 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1947).
718. 5 Wigmore, § 1617.
719. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 472 (1948).
720. Spurr v. United States, 87 Fed. 701, 713 (6th Cir. 1898).
721. Shibley v. United States, 237 F.2d 327 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 873 (1956).
The court (at 333) cited 5 Wigmore § 1618.
722. Ancine v. United States, 260 Fed. 827 (9th Cir. 1919), citing (at 828) 3 Wigmore,
Evidence § 1620 (1st ed. 1907). Hunter v. United States, 272 Fed. 235 (4th Cir. 1921);
Botts v. United States, 155 Fed. 50 (9th Cir. 1907) ; United States v. Johnson, 7 Fed. 453,
455 (C.C.S.C.N.Y. 1881); United States v. Grey, 26 Fed. Cas. 17 (No. 15251) (C.C.D.C.
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the general character of the premises to which the girls were taken, as
being a house of prostitution, could be admitted to show the character of
such premises and the intent of the defendant. 73
To be distinguished is the reputation of persons other than the defend-
ant. On counts for keeping a disorderly house and for keeping a bawdy
house the Government may give evidence of the general reputation of the
persons who visited the house. 724
On a liquor nuisance prosecution "general reputation of an individual
or a place" is admissible. "This is an exception to the hearsay rule, but
the exception does not extend so far as to permit of the proof of specific
acts .... 2
The defendant's reputation for not possessing the trait or traits of the
offense charged is admissible in his behalf.720' The defendant wished to
offer testimony to prove his general reputation for honesty in the com-
munity. The error in excluding was not cured by letting in proof of his
reputation for truth and veracity.
XVI. PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION
It is not clear from the cases whether hearsay evidence is admissible
at the preliminary examination. 72 7 It is not unlikely that hearsay evidence
is sometimes admitted.
728
XVII. NONADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS
In hearings on the issuance of search and arrest warrants, convincing
hearsay is often recognized as a basis for action.729 In 1963, Judge
Weinfeld stated: "The fact that the Commissioner acted upon hearsay
does not negate probable cause for the issuance of the warrant any more
so than where an indictment returned by a grand jury is based upon
hearsay information. 780
1826) ; United States v. Jamerson, 60 F. Supp. 281 (N.D. Iowa 1944). But see United States
v. Warner, 28 Fed. Cas. 404 (No. 16642) (C.C.D.C. 1833); United States v, Nailor, 27 Fed.
Cas. 69 (No. 15853) (C.C.D.C. 1833); United States v. Jourdine, 26 Fed. Cas. 666 (No.
15499) (C.C.D.C. 1833).
723. United States v. Jamerson, supra note 722.
724. United States v. Stevens, 27 Fed. Cas. 1312 (No. 16391) (C.C.D.C. 1833). See
United States v. Jamerson, 60 F. Supp. 281, 286 (N.D. Iowa 1945) (dictum).
725. Lambert v. United States, 26 F.2d 773, 774 (9th Cir. 1928).
726. Carnley v. United States, 274 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1960).
727. Orfield, Proceedings Before the Commissioner in Federal Criminal Procedure,
19 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 489, 529-34, 536-37, 563-65 (1958).
728. Orfield, Criminal Procedure From Arrest to Appeal 88 (1947). But see Note, 1963
Wash. U.L.Q. 102, 115-19.
729. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 262, 270-71 (1960); cf. Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959). See Note, 32 Ind. L.J. 332 (1957).
730. United States v. Casanova, 213 F. Supp. 654, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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In 1956, the Supreme Court held that a grand jury indictment may be
based on hearsay without other evidence. This did not violate the right
under the fifth amendment to indictment by a grand jury for capital or
otherwise infamous offense. 731 In the exercise of its supervisory power the
Court would not lay down a different rule. Mr. Justice Burton, con-
curring,73z agreed with the statement of Judge Learned Hand in the court
below that "if it appeared that no evidence had been offered that rationally
established the facts, the indictment ought to be quashed; because then
the grand jury would have in substance abdicated." 7 3 The latter view
seems the more sensible. Wigmore takes the position that grand juries
should not be bound by the rules of evidence because proceedings before
them are interlocutory and are based on probable cause.3
XVIII. SENTENCING
The sentencing reports of probation officers which must be left con-
fidential in the nature of the case are likely to involve hearsay, yet have
been upheld 33 The solution is procedural devices enabling the defendant
to meet the hearsay and so reduce its apparent force."' In 1962, the
Advisory Committee on Criminal Procedure of the Judicial Conference
proposed to amend Rule 32(c)(2) so that the defendant upon request
could obtain a summary of the presentence report before imposition
of sentence. This appears to be a step in the right direction.
731. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956). The case was followed in Ford v.
United States, 233 F.2d 56, 60 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956). See Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 400 (1959) (dictum); Orfield, op. cit. supra
note 728, at 163-64; Orfield, The Federal Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 343, 405.-407, 450-51
(1959); Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 331, 349 (1961); Note,
32 Ind. L.J. 332 (1957); Comment, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 1218, 1226 (1960); Note, 1963 Wash.
U.L.Q. 102 (1963) ; Note, 72 Yale L.J. 590 (1963).
732. 350 U.S. at 365.
733. United States v. Costello, 221 F.2d 668, 677 (2d Cir. 1955), citing Wigmore
§ 2364(a). Judge Frank concurred out of "esteem "for Judge Hand's wisdom," but hoped
that the Supreme Court would review the issue. 221 F.2d at 679-80.
734. 1 Wigmore § 4, at 21.
735. See Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 584 (1959); Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1949). Accord, Application of Hodge, 262 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1958);
Pence v. United States, 219 F.2d 70, 72 (10th Cir. 1955); Klingstein v. United States,
217 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1954) (per curiam); Price v. United States, 200 F.2d 652 (5th
Cir. 1953); Friedman v. United States, 200 F.2d 690, 697 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 926 (1953); Virgin Islands v. Price, 181 F.2d 394, 396 (3d Cir. 19S0); Taylor
v. United States, 179 F.2d 640 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 988 (1950); Sachs v.
Canal Zone, 176 F.2d 292, 299 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 858 (1949); United
States v. Nelms, 201 F. Supp. 890, 892 (W.D. Va.), aff'd, 291 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1961);
United States v. Durham, 181 F. Supp. 503 (D.D.C.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 854 (1960);
United States v. Clark, 11 F.R.D. 269 (W.D. Mo. 1951) (per curiam).
736. Orfield, op. cit. supra note 728, at 545-46; Orfield, Amending the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, 24 Notre Dame Law. 315, 340 (1949); Weinstein, supra note 731.
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XIX. HABEAS CORPUS
A recent commentator has pointed out: "The hearsay rule is uni-
versally enforced in habeas corpus, with the exception of the deportation
area."
37
XX. EXTRADITION
The hearsay rule does not seem to be applied in extradition cases. The
evidence is brought from outside the jurisdiction. Hence, the procurement
of evidence is likely to be hampered by the lack of power or practicability,
as well as by the differences of law in another system.781 Depositions
properly authenticated under the statute on international extradition have
been admitted.7"9 Certificates and affidavits are admissible. 740 Depositions
containing hearsay have been admitted; their hearsay nature merely
affects their weight. 7
41
Affidavits are often used in cases of interstate rendition. 42
737. Comment, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 1218, 1225 (1960); see Note, 111 U. Pa. L. Rev.
788, 795-97 (1963).
738. 1 Wigmore, § 4, at 24.
739. Coffins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 313 (1922); Collier v. Vaccaro, 51 F.2d 17 (4th
Cir. 1931).
740. Desmond v. Eggers, 18 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1927).
741. United States ex rel. Klein v. Milligan, 50 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S.
665 (1931). The court (at 688) cited 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 4 (2d ed. 1923). See also
President of the United States ex rel. Caputo v. Kelly, 19 F. Supp. 730, 737 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd,
92 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 635 (1938) (dying declaration of victim
of homicide in France.).
742. Munsey v. Claugh, 196 U.S. 364, 370, 374 (1905); Raferty ex rel. Huie Fong v. Bllgh,
55 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1932); United States ex rel. Austin v. Williams, 6 F.2d 13 (E.D. La.
1925), aff'd, 12 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1926).
